Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 41 | Issue 2

Article 5

May 2011

The Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act: The Need to Break the Constitutional Mold
Bailey Bifoss

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Bailey Bifoss, The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act: The Need to Break the Constitutional Mold, 41 Golden Gate U. L. Rev.
(2011).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol41/iss2/5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Bifoss: SORNA's Jurisdictional Hook
BIFOSS (FORMATTED).DOC

4/23/2011 2:07:55 PM

COMMENT
THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
AND NOTIFICATION ACT: THE NEED
TO BREAK THE CONSTITUTIONAL
MOLD
INTRODUCTION
Between 1937 and 1995, the United States Supreme Court failed to
strike down a single piece of federal legislation for falling outside the
authority granted by the Commerce Clause. 1 In 1995, however, the
Supreme Court shifted gears and adopted a more restrictive view of the
Commerce Clause. 2 In United States v. Lopez 3 and United States v.
Morrison, 4 the Court struck down federal legislation as outside the
purview of the Commerce Clause, but suggested in the text of its
decisions that the legislation may have been better suited against
constitutional challenge if it had contained a number of elements. 5 The
Court recommended that Congress bolster a statute’s legislative history
with findings supporting that statute’s connection to interstate
commerce. 6 Moreover, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court suggested that a
1

Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (“From
1937 until 1995, not one federal law was invalidated as exceeding the scope of Congress’ Commerce
Clause authority.”).
2
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
3
Id.
4
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
5
See Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. In Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005), the Court upheld the federal Controlled Substances Act, but nonetheless offered further
guidance on ways for Congress to draft its legislation in a way that would satisfy constitutional
scrutiny. Id. at 32-33.
6
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-63. In rejecting the Gun-Free School Zones Act as outside the
bounds of congressional authority, the Court stated, “Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a
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statute with an attenuated connection to interstate commerce might be
upheld if it supports a larger scheme regulating economic activity. 7 The
Court also recommended that Congress incorporate a jurisdictional hook
into its legislation, limiting that legislation’s application to circumstances
that substantially affect interstate commerce. 8
As a result of the Supreme Court’s instruction, Congress has altered
its legislation so that it fits a particular mold, ready for resistance against
constitutional challenge. By utilizing congressional findings, large
economic regulatory schemes, and the jurisdictional hook, Congress
created a constitutional mold that purports to limit legislation’s effect to
those circumstances that substantially affect interstate commerce. 9 This
constitutional mold sometimes increases a piece of legislation’s
connection to interstate commerce by properly limiting the application of
that legislation; other times, however, Congress superficially attaches
these elements to legislation without adding any substantive value. By
abusing its constitutional mold, Congress has been able to gain access to
nontraditional areas of federal regulation, including criminal conduct that
has traditionally been within the purview of the states’ police power. 10
The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) is an
example of legislation that utilizes the constitutional mold, as it contains
a jurisdictional hook that expressly limits its application to activities that
affect interstate commerce. 11 SORNA’s jurisdictional hook states that a
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated. . . . Second, § 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element which
would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate
commerce. . . . We agree with the Government that Congress normally is not required to make
formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce. But to the
extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial
effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
7
Raich, 545 U.S. at 32-33.
8
Id.
9
Christopher DiPompeo, Federal Hate Crime Laws and United States v. Lopez: On a
Collision Course to Clarify Jurisdictional-Element Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 617, 671 (2008);
Tara M. Stuckey, Note, Jurisdictional Hooks in the Wake of Raich: On Properly Interpreting
Federal Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2101, 2105 (2006) (“The
jurisdictional hook, or element, is a statutory clause that serves as a nexus between three points – a
piece of legislation, Congress’s constitutional power to enact that legislation, and Congress’s power
to regulate the particular conduct at issue.” (footnote omitted)).
10
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), overruled in part by Day-Brite
Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
11
Tara M. Stuckey, Note, Jurisdictional Hooks in the Wake of Raich: On Properly
Interpreting Federal Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2101, 2105
(2006) (“The jurisdictional hook, or element, is a statutory clause that serves as a nexus between
three points – a piece of legislation, Congress’s constitutional power to enact that legislation, and
Congress’s power to regulate the particular conduct at issue.” (footnote omitted)); see 18 U.S.C.A. §
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sex offender is guilty of violating its provisions if, after that offender
travels in interstate commerce, he or she fails to register or update a
registration as required. 12 This hook provides federal jurisdiction over
sex offenders even though SORNA’s purpose is to regulate criminal
conduct and thus traditionally within the states’ power to regulate. 13
SORNA, therefore, exemplifies the way jurisdictional hooks have taken
Congress beyond its traditional bounds.
Although much has been said about these topics separately, 14 this
Comment examines SORNA as an example of Congress’s ability to
abuse jurisdictional hooks to invade the states’ police power. Part I will
provide context to the discussion by examining the history and current
scope of proper congressional authority, including Congress’s
affirmative authority under the Commerce Clause, as well as the
countervailing limitation of the Tenth Amendment. Part I also provides
examples of proper jurisdictional hooks and identifies common
characteristics that belong to those hooks. Part II describes SORNA’s
jurisdictional hook in detail and evaluates it as an example of a
superficial jurisdictional hook with the sole purpose of providing a basis
for federal jurisdiction and infringing on the states’ police power. Part
III presents a solution to the problem of Congress’s federal invasion of
the states’ police power. That Part begins by asserting that the Supreme
Court should take a stronger stance in ensuring that Congress’s
constitutional mold adequately relates its legislation to interstate
commerce. It then argues that the United States Supreme Court should

2250(a) (Westlaw 2011) (“Whoever – (1) is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act; (2) . . . (B) travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or enters or leaves, or
resides in, Indian country; and (3) knowingly fails to register or update a registration as required by
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 10 years, or both.”).
12
18 U.S.C.A. § 2250(a) (Westlaw 2011) (emphasis added) (“Whoever – (1) is required to
register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act; (2) . . . (B) travels in interstate or
foreign commerce, or enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian country; and (3) knowingly fails to
register or update a registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”).
13
See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
14
See, e.g., Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After
Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
1675 (2002) (advocating for a purpose-nexus requirement between the jurisdictional element, the
Commerce Clause, and the purpose of the legislation at issue); Robin Morse, Note, Federalism
Challenges to the Adam Walsh Act, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1753 (2009) (arguing that the civil commitment
provision and the failure to register portion of SORNA are unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause); Tara M. Stuckey, Note, Jurisdictional Hooks in the
Wake of Raich: On Properly Interpreting Federal Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2101, 2105 (2006) (discussing the appropriate effect given to jurisdictional hooks in
as-applied challenges, post-Raich).
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address Congress’s pattern of creating legislation like SORNA by
reviving the strength of the Tenth Amendment as last seen in the second
era 15 of the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
I.

A CONSTITUTIONAL MOLD

In 1995, the Supreme Court struck down a piece of federal
legislation for exceeding its permissible scope under the Commerce
Clause for the first time since 1937. 16 Since that decision, Congress has
sought ways to reclaim the broad power it previously enjoyed under the
Commerce Clause. 17 As part of this endeavor, Congress has taken
various approaches recommended by the Court, including presenting
extensive congressional findings to support its legislation, and enacting
large regulatory schemes capable of concealing statutes that exceed
Additionally, Congress has inserted
congressional authority. 18
15

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145 (3d ed. 2009).
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist
Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (“From 1937 until 1995, not one federal law was
invalidated as exceeding the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.”); see also Christopher
DiPompeo, Federal Hate Crime Laws and United States v. Lopez: On a Collision Course to Clarify
Jurisdictional-Element Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 617 (2008); Diane McGimsey, Comment, The
Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the
Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675 (2002); Robin Morse, Note, Federalism
Challenges to the Adam Walsh Act, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1753 (2009); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical
Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause Counter-Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 880
(2005).
17
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q) (Westlaw 2011); see also Diane McGimsey, Comment, The
Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the
Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675, 1709 (2002) (“Taking the Court’s cue that
it would not review the channels and instrumentalities prongs of Congress’s Commerce Clause
power, Congress passed a revised version of the GFSZA, adding that the firearm in question must
have ‘moved in’ or must ‘otherwise affect[] interstate or foreign commerce.’ Although the Court
stated in Lopez that Congress cannot have a general police power, and although the rationales
espoused in the early channels and instrumentalities cases were probably never intended to justify
congressional regulation of a firearm that had once passed through interstate commerce via a state
line crossing fifty years earlier, the revised GFSZA shows that Congress is likely to use the
jurisdictional element to accomplish regulation with only an attenuated link to interstate commerce. .
. . The Court probably did not intend Lopez to serve as a mere statute-drafting seminar.” (footnotes
omitted)).
18
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-63 (1995). In rejecting the Gun-Free School
Zones Act as outside the bounds of congressional authority, the Court stated, “Section 922(q) is not
an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. . . . Second, § 922(q) contains no jurisdictional
element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question
affects interstate commerce. . . . We agree with the Government that Congress normally is not
required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate
commerce. But to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no
16
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jurisdictional hooks into legislation in order to make an express
connection between that legislation and interstate commerce. 19 This was
the case with SORNA and is the focus of this Comment.
To understand how Congress manipulates the bounds of its
authority through the use of a jurisdictional hook, it is helpful to discuss
the history, as well as the current scope, of proper congressional
authority. Because jurisdictional hooks are most often linked to
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, 20 this Part
describes the existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence. It also explains
the history and current scope of the countervailing limit to Congress’s
commerce power, the Tenth Amendment. Some jurisdictional hooks do,
in fact, bring legislation within the purview of the commerce power by
ensuring that legislation will only apply to those activities and
circumstances that genuinely affect interstate commerce. 21 These
jurisdictional hooks contain common characteristics not found in
superficial jurisdictional hooks like that found in SORNA. The Supreme
Court should look to these characteristics in evaluating Congress’s use of
the jurisdictional hook, and the Court should uphold only those
jurisdictional hooks that bring their accompanying legislation within the
purview of federal authority.
A.

THE FOUR ERAS OF COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

It is often stated that the federal government is one of enumerated
powers, and, to enact legislation, it must do so under the authority of one
of those powers. 22 Congress’s most utilized authority is that which stems
The countervailing force against
from the Commerce Clause. 23
such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.” Id. (internal citations
omitted); see also Christopher DiPompeo, Federal Hate Crime Laws and United States v. Lopez: On
a Collision Course to Clarify Jurisdictional-Element Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 617, 671 (2008).
19
See, e.g., Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250
(Westlaw 2011), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 16901-16962 (Westlaw 2011); Child Pornography Prevention Act
(“CPPA”), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A (Westlaw 2011); Interstate Domestic Violence Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §
2261 (Westlaw 2011); Gun-Free School Zones Act (“GFSZA”), 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(A)
(Westlaw 2011).
20
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (“From 1937
until 1995, not one federal law was invalidated as exceeding the scope of Congress’ Commerce
Clause authority. Countless criminal and civil laws were enacted under this constitutional power. It
was by far the most frequent source of authority for federal legislation.”).
21
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1202(b), 2312, 2313(a) (Westlaw 2011).
22
See e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (“The Constitution creates a Federal Government of
enumerated powers. See Art. I, § 8.”).
23
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2
PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (“From 1937 until 1995, not one federal law was invalidated as
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Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause is the principle of state sovereignty guided by the Tenth
Amendment. 24
The Commerce Clause states that Congress shall have the power
“[t]o regulate [c]ommerce . . . among the several [s]tates.” 25 This phrase,
although short, has been subject to a wide array of interpretation over the
course of four eras. 26 The first era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
typified by Gibbons v. Ogden, proved relatively uneventful. 27 In 1890,
however, “concurrent with the Industrial Revolution and the growth of
the national economy, Congress began using the Commerce Clause much
more extensively to regulate businesses.” 28 At that point, the Supreme
Court entered the second era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and
established limits on the breadth of the commerce power. 29 In the early
twentieth century, the Court went so far as to bar manufacturing and
production from the meaning of “commerce” 30 and limit the definition of
“among the states” to goods and activities that involved two or more
states. 31
In addition to limiting the scope of the Commerce Clause during the
second era, the Court also “held that Congress violates the Tenth
Amendment when it regulates matters left to state governments.” 32 In
Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Court rejected Congress’s attempt to regulate
child labor by prohibiting the interstate transportation of goods produced
using child labor. 33 The Court reasoned that “[t]he control by Congress
exceeding the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority. Countless criminal and civil laws
were enacted under this constitutional power. It was by far the most frequent source of authority for
federal legislation.”). Congress also uses its complementary authority under the Necessary and
Proper Clause to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
24
U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
25
U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3.
26
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 141 (3d ed. 2009) (“There have been
roughly four eras of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”).
27
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 144 (3d ed. 2009) (“During the remainder of the nineteenth century, until the
1890s, there were relatively few cases considering the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause
power.”).
28
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145 (3d ed. 2009).
29
Id.
30
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
31
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
32
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145 (3d ed. 2009).
33
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby,
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over interstate commerce cannot authorize the exercise of authority not
entrusted to it by the Constitution. The maintenance of the authority of
the states over matters purely local is . . . essential to the preservation of
our institutions . . . .” 34 Going beyond a mere limitation on the
commerce power, the Court affirmed the independent restriction of the
Tenth Amendment, stating that sustaining the federal child labor statute
at issue would “sanction an invasion by the federal power of the control
of a matter purely local in its character, and over which no authority has
been delegated to Congress in conferring the power to regulate
commerce among the states.” 35
The second era of Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence continued until the economic crisis of the Great
Depression, at which point Congress’s penchant for economic and
business regulation gained popularity. 36 For nearly sixty years, between
1937 and 1995, the Court did not overturn a single piece of legislation
for violating the Commerce Clause. 37 During those years, Congress’s
grant of authority was so broad that it led the Honorable Alex Kozinski
of the Ninth Circuit to brand it the “Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feellike Clause.” 38 Not surprisingly, this third era of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence also rejected any independent meaning of the Tenth
Amendment. 39 In United States v. Darby, the Court overruled Hammer
v. Dagenhart and allowed a federal regulation of minimum wage,
explaining that the Tenth Amendment was “but a truism that all is
retained which has not been surrendered.” 40
In 1995, the Supreme Court again shifted gears in United States v.
Lopez. 41 In Lopez, the federal legislation at issue was the Gun Free
School Zones Act (“GFSZA”), which made it a federal crime to possess
a gun within 1,000 feet of a school. 42 Under the 1937-1995 era of the
Commerce Clause, the Court almost certainly would have permitted such
legislation. 43 However, in Lopez, the Court limited the breadth of
312 U.S. 100 (1941).
34
Id. at 275 (citation omitted).
35
Id. at 276.
36
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 159 (3d ed. 2009).
37
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2 (2004).
38
Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 5 (1995).
39
See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
40
Id.
41
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
42
Id. at 551.
43
During this era, Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause was extremely broad. See
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (“From 1937 until
1995, not one federal law was invalidated as exceeding the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause
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Congress’s commerce authority to three broad areas: (1) “the use of the
channels of interstate commerce,” (2) “the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,” and (3)
“activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.” 44
Because the GFSZA did not involve the first two Lopez categories, and
the Court found no indication that the GFSZA had a “substantial effect”
on interstate commerce, the Court declared it outside the purview of
congressional authority. 45
Five years later, in United States v. Morrison, the Court applied the
criteria presented in Lopez to invalidate the Violence Against Women
Act (“VAWA”). 46 In the VAWA, Congress sought to create a federal
penalty for committing a gender-motivated crime. 47 In response to the
Court’s rejection of its use of Commerce Clause authority in Lopez,
Congress presented extensive findings concerning the effect of gendermotivated violence on interstate commerce as support for the VAWA. 48
Included in those findings was the conclusion that gender-motivated
violence, and regulation controlling such violence, affected an
individual’s willingness to travel interstate to areas considered dangerous
in the public eye. 49 In addition, Congress reasoned that individuals were
likely to be less productive when threatened with gender-motivated
violence, thereby also affecting interstate commerce. 50 The Court
rejected these assertions and, quoting the language in Lopez, stated that
“simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity
substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it
authority. Countless criminal and civil laws were enacted under this constitutional power. It was by
far the most frequent source of authority for federal legislation.”). It is likely that the Court would
not have struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act, as it did not strike down other, similar
legislation. See e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding a law prohibiting the
transportation of a woman in interstate commerce for purposes of prostitution); Hipolite Egg Co. v.
United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (upholding a congressional act prohibiting impure food and drugs
from being transported in interstate commerce); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding
a law enacted to keep the channels of commerce free from use in the transportation of lottery
tickets).
44
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
45
Id. at 567-68.
46
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602, 605 (2000).
47
42 U.S.C.A. § 13981(b) (Westlaw 2011) (“All persons within the United States shall have
the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender . . . .”).
48
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602, 614 (“§ 13981 is supported by numerous findings regarding the
serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and their families. See, e.g., H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 103-711, p. 385 (1994), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1994, pp. 1803, 1853;
S.Rep. No. 103-138, p. 40 (1993); S.Rep. No. 101-545, p. 33 (1990).”).
49
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602, 615 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (Conf.
Rep.)).
50
Id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol41/iss2/5

8

Bifoss: SORNA's Jurisdictional Hook
BIFOSS (FORMATTED).DOC

2011]

SORNA’S JURISDICTIONAL HOOK

4/23/2011 2:07:55 PM

263

so.” 51 Because the VAWA constituted a “regulation and punishment of
intrastate violence that [was] not directed at the instrumentalities,
channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce,” the Court
invalidated it as an improper use of the Commerce Clause. 52
Most recently the Court reaffirmed Congress’s power to regulate
intrastate activities under the Commerce Clause, to a degree, in Gonzales
v. Raich. 53 There, the Court upheld the Controlled Substances Act, 54
which prohibited the local cultivation and possession of marijuana. 55
Respondents, users of marijuana under California’s Compassionate Use
Act, 56 argued that they had no commercial impact because they
personally grew all of the marijuana they used. 57 The Court, however,
relied on Wickard v. Filburn 58 to establish that legislation that is part of a
larger regulatory scheme is properly within the purview of commerce
authority. 59 Despite respondents’ cultivation and use of marijuana
having no effect on interstate commerce, the Court found that it was
reasonable for Congress to regulate these activities in order to effectively
regulate the national market for the illegal drug. 60
With the onset of its new era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence –
the fourth 61 – the Supreme Court has also embarked on a new era of
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. However, contrary to the strong
protection for states’ rights seen during the second era, the Court’s most
recent interpretation of the Tenth Amendment is diluted. 62 Instead of
preserving the traditional police power of the states to regulate the
“safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public,” 63 the Court
instead preserved the more administrative elements of state
sovereignty. 64 Under what appears to be the emergence of the fourth era
of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has simply prevented
51

Id. at 602, 614 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995)).
Id. at 602, 618.
53
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
54
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq. (Westlaw 2011).
55
Raich, 545 U.S. at 5.
56
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Westlaw 2011).
57
Raich, 545 U.S. at 20.
58
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20
52

(1911).
59

Raich, 545 U.S. at 17-22.
Id. at 32-33.
61
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 183 (3d ed. 2009).
62
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
60

(1992).
63

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
64
See Printz, 521 U.S. 898; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144.
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Congress from “commandeer[ing] the legislative processes of the States
by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program.” 65
B.

PROPER JURISDICTIONAL HOOKS: THOSE LIMITING LEGISLATION’S
EFFECT TO ACTIVITIES AFFECTING INTERSTATE COMMERCE

Since its commerce power was circumscribed between 1995 and
2005, Congress has sought to comply with the Court’s instructions
concerning the attributes and requirements of constitutionally
permissible legislation. 66 Although Congress has taken advantage of the
presumption of constitutionality the jurisdictional hook creates, there is,
admittedly, a reason why this presumption exists. Often, as in the
circumstances that follow, the inclusion of a jurisdictional hook brings
legislation within the purview of federal authority to regulate. 67 These
proper jurisdictional hooks share characteristics, including the ability to
(1) limit the statute’s effect to those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce, 68 and (2) create a connection between the
jurisdictional hook and the criminal activity being regulated. 69
Importantly, these characteristics are not found in jurisdictional hooks
like that in SORNA.
Many jurisdictional hooks adequately connect legislation to
interstate commerce by ensuring that the scope of the legislation is
limited to activities that actually affect interstate commerce, and that the
interstate travel has some relation to the criminal activity being

65

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981); see
also Printz, 521 U.S. 898; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 161.
66
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q) (Westlaw 2011); see also Diane McGimsey, Comment, The
Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the
Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675, 1709 (2002) (“Taking the Court’s cue that
it would not review the channels and instrumentalities prongs of Congress’s Commerce Clause
power, Congress passed a revised version of the GFSZA, adding that the firearm in question must
have ‘moved in’ or must ‘otherwise affect[] interstate or foreign commerce.’ Although the Court
stated in Lopez that Congress cannot have a general police power, and although the rationales
espoused in the early channels and instrumentalities cases were probably never intended to justify
congressional regulation of a firearm that had once passed through interstate commerce via a state
line crossing fifty years earlier, the revised GFSZA shows that Congress is likely to use the
jurisdictional element to accomplish regulation with only an attenuated link to interstate commerce.”
(footnotes omitted)).
67
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1202(b), 2312, 2313(a) (Westlaw 2011).
68
Jurisdictional hooks should limit a statute’s effect to those activities that “substantially
affect” interstate commerce, as that was the standard articulated by the Court in United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
69
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1202(b), 2312, 2313(a) (Westlaw 2011).
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regulated. 70 For example, the federal kidnapping statute provides that a
person who knowingly transports or transfers proceeds of a kidnapping,
or “receives, possesses, conceals, or disposes” of such proceeds after
they have traveled in interstate commerce, is guilty of a crime. 71 Of
course, most United States currency has traveled in interstate commerce.
However, unlike SORNA, the federal kidnapping statute places a real
limit on the application of the statute, applying it only to that currency
which has actually been used in a kidnapping. 72 Furthermore, the
jurisdictional hook in the federal kidnapping statute provides a
connection between the criminal activity being regulated and the
interstate travel. The kidnapping statute will never affect wholly
innocent interstate travel, as someone convicted for violating this statute
is required to have had knowledge of the currency’s role in the
kidnapping. 73
Similarly, the original federal carjacking statute, passed in 1919,
contains a substantive jurisdictional hook that distinguishes it from 1992
legislation intended to toughen federal carjacking law. 74 The 1919
statute, commonly known as the Dyer Act, provides that anyone who
transports a motor vehicle in interstate commerce, knowing that the
vehicle was stolen, is guilty of a crime. 75 This statute, therefore, limits
its application to criminal activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce. 76 Conversely, the 1992 legislation provides that “[w]hoever .
. . takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in
interstate or foreign commerce” shall be fined or imprisoned. 77 This
statute will reach almost every individual who steals a car, since there is
no nexus between the criminal act and the vehicle or offender’s interstate
travel. 78
Although the two statutes are very similar, the Dyer Act contains a
70

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1202(b), 2312, 2313(a) (Westlaw

2011).
71

18 U.S.C.A. § 1202(b) (Westlaw 2011) (emphasis added).
See id.
73
Id.
74
Compare 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2312, 2313 (Westlaw 2011) with 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119 (Westlaw
2011); see also Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez
and Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675,
1710-11 (2002).
75
18 U.S.C.A. § 2312 (Westlaw 2011). The legislation also provides that anyone who
“receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any motor vehicle . . . which has
crossed a State or United States boundary after being stolen, knowing the same to have been stolen”
shall be guilty of a federal crime. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2313 (Westlaw 2011).
76
See id.
77
18 U.S.C.A. § 2119 (Westlaw 2011).
78
See id.
72
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jurisdictional hook that “ensure[s] that a regulated activity substantially
affects interstate commerce,” thereby ensuring that it is an appropriate
use of federal authority. 79 The Dyer Act limits its focus to circumstances
when an individual steals a car and takes it across state lines. 80 Each
time a federal prosecutor obtains a conviction under the Dyer Act, the
defendant is someone who knowingly transported a stolen car across
state lines or otherwise knowingly dealt with a stolen car that had
recently been transported across state lines. 81 When compared with the
1992 legislation expanding the reach of federal carjacking law, the
substantive nature of the Dyer Act becomes even more apparent.
The 1992 federal carjacking statute expands federal jurisdiction by
allowing federal prosecution of any person who has stolen a car that, at
one point in time, traveled across state lines. 82 This allows the
legislation to apply to defendants who steal cars and transport them
across state lines – the same defendants guilty under the Dyer Act – and,
more importantly, a defendant who steals a car and moves it across town.
Unlike the jurisdictional hook in the Dyer Act, the jurisdictional hook in
the 1992 federal carjacking statute provides no real limitation on the type
of activities it affects; so long as the stolen car moved in interstate
commerce at some point, it falls under this statute. After 1992, therefore,
a federal prosecutor may pursue almost any person who has stolen a car,
since practically all cars have traveled in interstate commerce at some
point – most even before they are sold. 83 Furthermore, the jurisdictional
hook in the 1992 federal carjacking statute has no necessary nexus to the
actual criminal activity. In a circumstance where a car was moved in
interstate commerce during its manufacture, and stolen several years
after the car’s sale, the car’s interstate travel has no relation to the
criminal activity. The Dyer Act, unlike the 1992 carjacking statute and
other examples of more recent federal legislation (such as SORNA), has
a necessary and meaningful nexus to interstate commerce; for these
reasons, the Dyer Act falls within the appropriate purview of the
Commerce Clause.
Although the use of jurisdictional hooks is prevalent, the judicial
79

Christopher DiPompeo, Federal Hate Crime Laws and United States v. Lopez: On a
Collision Course to Clarify Jurisdictional-Element Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 617, 649 (2008).
80
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2312, 2313 (Westlaw 2011); see also Diane McGimsey, Comment, The
Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the
Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675, 1710 (2002).
81
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2312, 2313 (Westlaw 2011).
82
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2319 (Westlaw 2011).
83
Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and
Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675, 1711
(2002).
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response to their use has been mixed. 84 The Supreme Court has not
expressly ruled on the issue; however, most courts of appeals have held
that the mere existence of a jurisdictional hook, by itself, cannot
guarantee constitutionality. 85 This purported case-by-case analysis
concerning the sufficiency of a jurisdictional hook is effective in theory.
Beyond the refusal to uphold legislation solely on the basis of a
jurisdictional hook, however, no clear guidelines have been set forth for
the use of the jurisdictional hook. This ambiguity allows courts full
discretion to determine which jurisdictional hooks are sufficient. In
circumstances like SORNA, this discretion manifests itself in emotional
and political concerns taking precedence over concerns for federal
restraint. 86
II.

THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACT

SORNA is a textbook example of Congress’s use of a superficial
jurisdictional hook to obtain federal authority over a traditionally stateregulated field. An understanding of SORNA’s background and
structure is essential in order to recognize the pretextual nature of its
jurisdictional hook. Unlike the Dyer Act, which provided a clear and
84

Although courts of appeals considering the issue have held that the mere presence of a
jurisdictional hook is insufficient to guarantee constitutionality, courts have still been willing to
uphold jurisdictional hooks without any real discussion as to their sufficiency. Compare United
States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The mere presence of a jurisdictional element . .
. does not in and of itself insulate a statute from judicial scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, or
render it per se constitutional.” (quoting United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 585 (3d Cir. 1995))),
with United States v. George, 625 F.3d 1124, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing SORNA’s
jurisdictional hook as follows: “SORNA was enacted to keep track of sex offenders. Such offenders
are required to ‘register, and keep registration current, in each jurisdiction’ where the offender lives,
works, or goes to school. As stated by the Eighth Circuit, ‘[t]his language indicates Congress
wanted registration to track the movement of sex offenders through different jurisdictions.’ ‘Under §
2250, Congress limited the enforcement of the registration requirement to only those sex offenders
who were either convicted of a federal sex offense or who move in interstate commerce.’ The
requirements of § 16913 are reasonably aimed at ‘regulating persons or things in interstate
commerce and the use of the channels of interstate commerce.” (internal citations omitted)).
85
See Rodia, 194 F.3d at 472 (“The mere presence of a jurisdictional element . . . does not in
and of itself insulate a statute from judicial scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, or render it per se
constitutional.” (quoting United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 585 (3d Cir. 1995))); Christopher
DiPompeo, Federal Hate Crime Laws and United States v. Lopez: On a Collision Course to Clarify
Jurisdictional-Element Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 617, 650 (2008) (“Nearly every federal court of
appeals that has considered the question has held that the mere presence of a jurisdictional element is
not sufficient to ensure a statute’s constitutionality.”).
86
See the congressional discussion of SORNA, where one supporter asked, “Isn't it common
sense to protect young schoolchildren in the first place by keeping these pedophiles locked up with
lengthy prison sentences? Isn't it common sense that coddling repeated sex offenders with selfesteem courses and rehabilitation doesn't work, and that locking them up works?” 152 CONG. REC.
H647-05 (daily ed. March 8, 2006) (statement of Mr. Keller).
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substantive connection to interstate commerce, SORNA’s connection to
interstate commerce is superficial. SORNA’s jurisdictional hook has no
genuine purpose in controlling interstate commerce; instead, it acts
merely as a mechanism to guarantee federal jurisdiction. For these
reasons, SORNA serves as an ideal example of a case in which the Court
should intervene and find such legislation beyond the constitutional
powers of Congress.
A.

HISTORY OF SORNA

Under SORNA, a person who meets the definition of a sex offender
must register where he or she lives, works, and goes to school, and must
keep the registration current. 87 The offender must also initially register
in the state where he or she was convicted. 88 The duration of a sex
offender’s registration requirement is based on his or her classification
under SORNA. 89 To be guilty of an offense under SORNA, a sex
offender must (1) be required to register, 90 (2) travel in interstate
commerce, and (3) knowingly fail to register or update as required. 91
The United States Supreme Court recently clarified that an offender must
complete these elements in sequential order in order to have violated this

87

42 U.S.C.A. § 16913(a) (Westlaw 2011).
Id.
89
42 U.S.C.A. § 16911 (Westlaw 2011) (“Tier I sex offender: The term “tier I sex offender”
means a sex offender other than a tier II or tier III sex offender. . . . Tier II sex offender: The term
“tier II sex offender” means a sex offender other than a tier III sex offender whose offense is
punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year and -- (A) is comparable to or more severe than
the following offenses, when committed against a minor, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such
an offense against a minor: (i) sex trafficking (as described in section 1591 of Title 18); (ii) coercion
and enticement (as described in section 2422(b) of Title 18); (iii) transportation with intent to engage
in criminal sexual activity (as described in section 2423(a)) of Title 18; (iv) abusive sexual contact
(as described in section 2244 of Title 18); (B) involves -- (i) use of a minor in a sexual performance;
(ii) solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution; or (iii) production or distribution of child
pornography; or (C) occurs after the offender becomes a tier I sex offender. . . . Tier III sex offender
The term “tier III sex offender” means a sex offender whose offense is punishable by imprisonment
for more than 1 year and -- (A) is comparable to or more severe than the following offenses, or an
attempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense: (i) aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (as
described in sections 2241 and 2242 of Title 18); or (ii) abusive sexual contact (as described in
section 2244 of Title 18) against a minor who has not attained the age of 13 years; (B) involves
kidnapping of a minor (unless committed by a parent or guardian); or (C) occurs after the offender
becomes a tier II sex offender.”).
90
42 U.S.C.A. § 16913(a) (Westlaw 2011) (“A sex offender shall register, and keep the
registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an
employee, and where the offender is a student. For initial registration purposes only, a sex offender
shall also register in the jurisdiction in which convicted if such jurisdiction is different from the
jurisdiction of residence.”).
91
18 U.S.C.A. § 2250(a) (Westlaw 2011).
88
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section, thereby excluding offenders who traveled in interstate commerce
prior to SORNA’s enactment. 92
However, SORNA is only the most recent effort in fifteen years of
congressional attempts to regulate sex offenders. 93 In 1994, Congress
encouraged states to enact some form of sex-offender registry by passing
the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Act (“Jacob Wetterling Act”). 94 When states were
slow to comply with the Jacob Wetterling Act, Congress amended the
legislation to include Megan’s Law, making public notification of a sex
offender’s presence compulsory. 95 Courts consistently upheld Megan’s
Law and the Jacob Wetterling Act, and by 1997 all fifty states had
enacted some version of a sex-offender registry. 96
The Jacob Wetterling Act and Megan’s Law provided states with a
great deal of discretion concerning registry requirements, leaving the
nation with a multitude of various requirements. 97 As a result of these
differences, over 100,000 people who were legally required to register as
sex offenders failed to do so. 98 In 2006, in an attempt to prevent
individuals from slipping through the cracks, Congress enacted SORNA
as part of the Adam Walsh Act. 99 Congress designed SORNA to
92

Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010). In Carr, the Court did not have the occasion
to rule on SORNA’s permissibility under the Commerce Clause. Therefore, the highest authorities
on the issue are the decisions of the United States courts of appeals.
93
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (Westlaw 2011) (incorporating Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat.
1796, 2038-2042 (1994), and Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104–145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996).
94
Id.
95
Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104–145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996). Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89
(2003) (“Megan Kanka was a 7-year-old New Jersey girl who was sexually assaulted and murdered
in 1994 by a neighbor who, unknown to the victim’s family, had prior convictions for sex offenses
against children.”); see also Eric S. Janus & Emily A. Polachek, A Crooked Picture: Re-Framing the
Problem of Child Sexual Abuse, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 142, 153 (2009).
96
Eric S. Janus & Emily A. Polachek, A Crooked Picture: Re-Framing the Problem of Child
Sexual Abuse, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 142, 151 (2009); see also Smith, 538 U.S. at 90; Nat’l Ctr.
for Missing and Exploited Children, Map of Registered Sex Offenders in the United States (Dec. 17,
2010), available at http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/documents/sex-offender-map.pdf.
97
Terra R. Lord, Comment, Closing Loopholes or Creating More? Why a Narrow
Application of SORNA Threatens to Defeat the Statute’s Purpose, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 273, 280 (2010)
(“Because the Wetterling Act established only a baseline recommendation for sex offender
registration requirements, the states maintained significant discretion in deciding which crimes
triggered registration, appropriate tracking methods, and punishment provisions. As a result, the sex
offender registration laws varied significantly from state-to-state.” (citing Lara Geer Farley, Note,
The Adam Walsh Act: The Scarlet Letter of the Twenty-First Century, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 471, 47680 (2008))).
98
152 CONG. REC. S8012-02, 13 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch of Utah).
99
See Adam Walsh Child Protection & Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat.
587 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.) (“An Act To protect children from sexual
exploitation and violent crime, to prevent child abuse and child pornography, to promote Internet
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establish a comprehensive national sex-offender registry to ensure
uniform requirements that would prevent individuals from avoiding
compliance due to inconsistent standards. 100 Unlike the Jacob Wetterling
Act and Megan’s Law, SORNA came equipped with a myriad of specific
requirements with which states had to comply in order to receive federal
funding. 101 For example, in 2010, the Attorney General issued the
National Guidelines for SORNA, requiring that, in collecting a sex
offender’s name, a state must obtain
[t]he name of the sex offender (including any alias used by the
individual). The names and aliases required by this provision include,
in addition to registrants’ primary or given names, nicknames and
pseudonyms generally, regardless of the context in which they are
used, any designations or monikers used for self-identification in
Internet communications or postings, and ethnic or tribal names by
which they are commonly known. 102

If a state fails to “substantially comply” with the administrative
provisions of SORNA, it risks ten percent of its federal funding from the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. 103 Nonetheless, by August
2010, four years after SORNA’s enactment, only Delaware, Florida,
Ohio, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, and
the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation had
substantially implemented SORNA. 104 Presumably because of the high
cost of compliance, the other 237 registration jurisdictions have
requested and received extensions until July 27, 2011. 105 Despite this,
safety, and to honor the memory of Adam Walsh and other child crime victims.”); see also 42
U.S.C.A. § 16901 (Westlaw 2011) (“Congress in this chapter establishes a comprehensive national
system for the registration of those offenders . . . .”).
100
42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (Westlaw 2011); see also 152 CONG. REC. S8012-02, 20 (daily ed.
July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Cantwell of Wash.) (“Child sex offenders have exploited this
stunning lack of uniformity, and the consequences have been tragic.”); Id. at 33 (statement of Sen.
DeWine of Ohio) (“Although each State has a registry, there are no uniform standards. There is no
easy way to access information from different jurisdictions. This act creates a uniform Federal
standard . . . .”); Id. at 30 (statement of Sen. Reid of Nev.) (“The bill before us will establish uniform
rules for the information sex offenders are required to report and when they are required to report it.
It will also give law enforcement agencies the tools they need to enforce these requirements.”).
101
Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, National Guidelines for Sex
Offender
Registration
and
Notification,
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/final_sornaguidelines.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
102
Id. at 27 (internal quotations omitted).
103
42 U.S.C.A. § 16925(a) (Westlaw 2011).
104
Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking,
U.S. Department of Justice: SORNA Extensions Granted (2010), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/SORNA_Extensions_Granted.pdf.
105
Id.
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more than 700,000 people were registered as sex offenders in various
registries in 2009, a clear indication that sex-offender legislation like
SORNA is affecting the lives of individuals. 106
Not surprisingly, SORNA has faced a number of constitutional
challenges spanning the breadth of jurisprudence addressing
congressional authority. 107 Offenders convicted under its terms have
brought challenges to the Act based on, among other things, 108
Congress’s lack of authority to enact the legislation. 109
At least nine federal courts of appeals have held that Congress has
the affirmative authority to enact SORNA under both the Commerce
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. 110 Under these holdings,
Section 2250, the section establishing the requirements for a sex offender
to be guilty of a violation under SORNA, is constitutional. 111 Section
2250’s jurisdictional hook provides that a violation of SORNA can only
occur if a person has traveled in interstate commerce. 112 By inserting
this element, Section 2250 directly conforms to the Supreme Court
jurisprudence allowing Congress to regulate people traveling in interstate

106

See Nat'l Ctr. for Missing and Exploited Children, Map of Registered Sex Offenders in the
United States (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/documents/sex-offendermap.pdf.
107
See, e.g., Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010); United States v. George, 625 F.3d
1124 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v.
Guzman, 591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Zuniga, 579 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254 (5th Cir.
2009); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202
(11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lawrance,
548 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 2008).
108
Challenges have been brought against SORNA based on an offender’s obligation to
register before SORNA was enacted, and before the Attorney General issued SORNA’s final
guidelines. See Terra R. Lord, Comment, Closing Loopholes or Creating More? Why a Narrow
Application of SORNA Threatens to Defeat the Statute’s Purpose, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 273, 280
(2010). Challenges have also been brought against SORNA’s civil commitment provision. See
Robin Morse, Note, Federalism Challenges to the Adam Walsh Act, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1753 (2009).
All of these challenges are beyond the scope of this Comment. A comprehensive list of challenges
brought against SORNA can be found at Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring,
Apprehending, Registering and Tracking (SMART), U.S. Department of Justice, Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Case Law Summary: January 2008-July 2009 (2009), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/caselaw/caselawsum.pdf.
109
See, e.g., George, 625 F.3d 1124; Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151; Guzman, 591 F.3d 83;
Zuniga, 579 F.3d 845; Whaley, 577 F.3d 254; Gould, 568 F.3d 459; Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202; Howell,
552 F.3d 709; Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Section 2250 also requires that, in order to be guilty of violating SORNA, a sex offender
must be required to register under § 16913 and must have failed to register or update a registration
after having traveled in interstate commerce.
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commerce. 113
Courts have also consistently validated the congressional authority
to pass Section 16913. 114 Section 16913 simply requires that all sex
offenders register where they live, work, and go to school, and thereby is
outside the purview of any of the three Lopez categories. 115
Nevertheless, courts have found authorization for this “complementary”
section of SORNA within the Necessary and Proper Clause. 116 The
Second Circuit, for example, found that “[r]equiring sex offenders to
update their registrations due to intrastate changes of address or
employment status is a perfectly logical way to help ensure that states
will more effectively be able to track sex offenders when they do cross
state lines.” 117 According to the majority of jurisdictions, the intrastate
activity regulated by Section 16913 is “reasonably adapted” to the goal
of creating a comprehensive national sex-offender registry. 118 By
justifying Section 2250 under Congress’s Commerce Clause authority,119
and Section 16913 under the Necessary and Proper Clause, 120 courts
have uniformly accepted the contention that SORNA is a valid exercise
of congressional authority. 121
B.

SORNA’S JURISDICTIONAL HOOK
SORNA’s jurisdictional hook, requiring that a sex offender have

113

Guzman, 591 F.3d at 90; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Shenandoah, 595 F.3d at 160; Guzman, 591 F.3d at 91; Whaley, 577 F.3d at 261; Gould,
568 F.3d at 471; Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1212; Howell, 552 F.3d at 717.
115
42 U.S.C.A. § 16913 (Westlaw 2011); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (Congress may regulate
(1) “the use of the channels of interstate commerce,” (2) “the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,” and (3) “activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce”); see also Guzman, 591 F.3d at 91; Gould, 568 F.3d at 471
(implicitly acknowledging that § 16913 does not fall within the purview of the Commerce Clause by
upholding § 2250 under the Commerce Clause, but using the Necessary and Proper Clause to uphold
§ 16913.).
116
Whaley, 577 F.3d at 259.
117
Guzman, 591 F.3d at 91.
118
Shenandoah, 595 F.3d at 160; Guzman, 591 F.3d at 91; Whaley, 577 F.3d at 261; Gould,
568 F.3d at 471; Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1212; Howell, 552 F.3d at 717.
119
United States v. George, 625 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010); Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151;
Guzman, 591 F.3d 83; United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Zuniga,
579 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2009); Whaley, 577 F.3d 254; Gould, 568 F.3d 459; Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202;
Howell, 552 F.3d 709; United States v. Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 2008).
120
Shenandoah, 595 F.3d at 160; Guzman, 591 F.3d at 91; Whaley, 577 F.3d at 261; Gould,
568 F.3d at 471; Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1212; Howell, 552 F.3d at 717.
121
George, 625 F.3d 1124; Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151; Guzman, 591 F.3d 83; Cain, 583 F.3d
408; Zuniga, 579 F.3d 845; Whaley, 577 F.3d 254; Gould, 568 F.3d 459; Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202;
Howell, 552 F.3d 709; Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329.
114
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traveled in interstate commerce before a failure to register can be a
violation, has yielded rulings that the legislation is constitutional. 122
However, despite this judicial approval, SORNA’s jurisdictional hook
does nothing to ensure that its application will be limited to the subset of
instances that actually affect interstate commerce.
Furthermore,
SORNA’s jurisdictional hook does nothing to ensure that the criminal
activity being regulated is related to interstate travel. Because SORNA
fails to satisfy either of the characteristics common to substantive
jurisdictional hooks, it resembles jurisdictional hooks that courts have
deemed insufficient to sustain legislation. 123 On a policy level,
moreover, nothing in SORNA helps to alleviate the fundamental issues
presented by its federal intrusion outside of constitutionally prescribed
bounds. 124
1.

SORNA’s Jurisdictional Hook Fails to Limit Its Application to
Circumstances That Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce

SORNA’s jurisdictional hook is similar to the one in the Child
Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA). Courts found the CPPA’s
jurisdictional hook insufficient to sustain the legislation because it failed
to limit its impact to those activities and circumstances that substantially
affect interstate commerce in the manner required by United States v.
Lopez. 125 Because SORNA suffers from the same defect as the CPPA,
the Court should apply a similar analysis to invalidate it.
The CPPA, in relevant part, provides that any person who
“knowingly possesses” child pornography that has “been mailed, or has
been shipped or transported using any means or facility of interstate or

122

18 U.S.C.A. § 2250(a) (Westlaw 2011); see also George, 625 F.3d 1124; Shenandoah, 595
F.3d 151; Guzman, 591 F.3d 83; Cain, 583 F.3d 408; Zuniga, 579 F.3d 845; Whaley, 577 F.3d 254;
Gould, 568 F.3d 459; Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202; Howell, 552 F.3d 709; Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329.
123
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (Westlaw 2011); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942); Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911).
124
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995).
125
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Westlaw 2011); see also United States v. Rodia, 194
F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir. 1999) (“As a practical matter, the limiting jurisdictional factor is almost
useless here, since all but the most self-sufficient child pornographers will rely on film, cameras, or
chemicals that traveled in interstate commerce and will therefore fall within the sweep of the
statute.”); United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 546 U.S. 801 (2005),
rev'd, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003),
overruled by Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 229
(5th Cir. 2000). Although these courts found that the CPPA’s jurisdictional hook was insufficient to
sustain the legislation, it was eventually upheld under an analysis of the sort applied in Raich. 545
U.S. 1.
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foreign commerce . . . or which was produced using materials which
have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including
by computer” is guilty of a federal offense. 126 In evaluating Congress’s
power to enact the CPPA, courts reaffirmed that the proper role of the
jurisdictional hook would be to “ensure a statute’s constitutionality when
the element either limits the regulation to interstate activity or ensures
that the intrastate activity to be regulated falls within one of the three
Because the CPPA’s
categories of congressional power.” 127
jurisdictional hook did not sufficiently limit its reach to those activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce, courts reviewing its
constitutionality deemed the jurisdictional hook insufficient to sustain the
legislation. 128
The Third Circuit, as well as other courts considering the issue,
determined that the jurisdictional hook was too attenuated to
appropriately limit the reach of the CPPA. 129 Section 2252 of the CPPA,
a statute prohibiting the making of child pornography using film or
cameras that traveled in interstate commerce, was labeled “almost
useless . . . since all but the most self-sufficient child pornographers will
rely on film, cameras, or chemicals that traveled in interstate commerce
and will therefore fall within the sweep of the statute.” 130 Section 2252,
therefore, did not bear a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce because
it “encompasse[d] virtually every case imaginable, so long as any
modern-day photographic equipment or material has been used.” 131
Practically, therefore, the Third Circuit rejected the CPPA’s
jurisdictional hook because it did not limit its effect to a subset of
circumstances where interstate commerce was substantially affected.
Similar to the jurisdictional hook in the CPPA, SORNA’s
jurisdictional hook serves no real limiting function. The requirement that
a person travel in interstate commerce encompasses the vast majority of
the population. 132 The Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to
126

18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Westlaw 2011).
Rodia, 194 F.3d at 473 (citing United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 594 (3d Cir. 1995));
see also McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1124.
128
Id.
129
Rodia, 194 F.3d at 473.
130
Id.
131
McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1124 (emphasis in original).
132
WENDELL COX & JEAN LOVE, AMERICAN HIGHWAY USERS ALLIANCE, 40 YEARS OF THE
US
INTERSTATE
HIGHWAY
SYSTEM:
AN
ANALYSIS
(1996),
available
at
http://www.publicpurpose.com/freeway1.htm (“Each year, nearly one trillion person miles are
carried on the interstate highway system --- a figure equal to providing trips around the world for 37
million people --- more people than live in Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Ohio combined. In its 40
years, more than 17 trillion person miles have been traveled over the interstate highway system.”).
127
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address this overbreadth but declined to do so. 133 In United States v.
Carr, the defendant’s last interstate travel was at least two years prior to
his indictment under SORNA. 134 Although the Court ultimately held
that SORNA did not apply to Carr, it based its holding on the fact that
Carr’s interstate travel was complete prior to SORNA’s enactment in
2006. 135 In other words, the Court did not consider any temporal
limitation on the connection between a person’s interstate travel and his
or her failure to register, other than the requirement that the travel have
occurred since 2006. 136 The limitation imposed by the Court in Carr is
therefore insufficient to address the attenuation between a sex offender’s
failure to register and his or her travel in interstate commerce. Under the
present jurisprudence interpreting SORNA, a sex offender could travel
from California to Nevada in 2006, live in Nevada for 4 years as a
convicted and registered sex offender, and be convicted of violating
SORNA in 2011 for moving across town and failing to update a
registration. 137 This result becomes more absurd the longer SORNA is in
effect. 138
2.

SORNA’s Provisions Do Not Support a Genuine Connection
Between Interstate Commerce and the Criminal Activity Being
Regulated

In addition to encompassing nearly every individual convicted of a
sex offense, SORNA also fails to require any connection between an
offender’s interstate travel and his or her failure to register as a sex
offender. When an individual’s interstate travel is months or years prior
to that individual’s failure to register as a sex offender, that interstate
travel is almost certainly unrelated to the criminal activity at issue.
Without a requirement that the offender’s interstate travel be conducted
with the intention of avoiding registration requirements, there is no
guarantee that even recent interstate travel will be related to the criminal
activity. Moreover, there is no evidence that Congress even sought to
133

Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010).
Id. at 2233.
135
Id. at 2236-42.
136
Id.
137
Concededly, there is no caselaw indicating that SORNA has been used in this manner.
However, current law would permit this application, which becomes more likely as more time passes
since 2006.
138
For example, consider the same scenario in which a sex offender travels interstate in 2006,
and then resides in the same state until 2030. That person may be convicted of violating SORNA in
2030 for moving across town and failing to update a registration, based solely on that person’s
interstate travel in 2006.
134
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genuinely relate an offender’s interstate travel to the national sexoffender registry. 139 SORNA’s text and legislative history provide
evidence that the real focus of the Act is to create a national registry for
sex offenders. 140
The majority of SORNA’s provisions enable its implementation or
address the criminalization of a sex offender’s failure to register in a
particular jurisdiction. 141 In fact, the only language that addresses a sex
offender’s interstate travel is the jurisdictional hook in Section 2250. 142
The remaining text of the legislation defines relevant terms, 143 sets out
jurisdictional requirements, 144 and identifies when, where, and how
individuals so labeled must register. 145 The focus of SORNA’s text,
therefore, is not the regulation of interstate commerce; rather, it is simply
the “regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed
at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate
commerce.” 146
SORNA’s statutory provisions appear to be consistent with the
motivation of its drafters. 147 Its legislative history indicates three
themes: (1) protection of children, 148 (2) prevention of crime, 149 and (3)
uniformity among sex-offender registry laws. 150 Before SORNA was
enacted, members of Congress and other individuals speaking on behalf
of the proposed legislation expressed their horror at the “recent cases of
abductions and murders of children by sex offenders,” and supported the
139

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250 (Westlaw 2011), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 16901-16962 (Westlaw 2011);
see also 152 CONG. REC. E404-01 (daily ed. March 16, 2006) (Speech of Hon. Patrick J. Kennedy of
R.I.); 152 CONG. REC. H647-05 (daily ed. March 8, 2006) (statement of Mr. Keller); 152 CONG.
REC. S8012-02, 20, 22, 30 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statements of Sen. Cantwell of Wash., Sen.
DeWine of Ohio, Sen. Reid of Nev.).
140
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (Westlaw 2011); see also 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 16901-16962
(Westlaw 2011).
141
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250 (Westlaw 2011), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 16901-16962 (Westlaw 2011).
142
18 U.S.C.A. § 2250(a) (Westlaw 2011).
143
42 U.S.C.A. § 16911 (Westlaw 2011).
144
42 U.S.C.A. § 16912 (Westlaw 2011).
145
42 U.S.C.A. § 16913 (Westlaw 2011).
146
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602, 618 (2000).
147
See 152 CONG. REC. H647-05 (daily ed. March 8, 2006) (statement of Mr. Keller), 152
CONG. REC. E404-01 (daily ed. March 16, 2006) (Speech of Hon. Patrick J. Kennedy of R.I.), 152
CONG. REC. S8012-02, 20, 22, 30 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statements of Sen. Cantwell of Wash.,
Sen. DeWine of Ohio, Sen. Reid of Nev.).
148
See 152 CONG. REC. E404-01, 1 (daily ed. March 16, 2006) (Speech of Hon. Patrick J.
Kennedy of R.I.); see also 152 CONG. REC. H647-05 (daily ed. March 8, 2006) (statement of Mr.
Keller).
149
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (Westlaw 2011).
150
152 CONG. REC. S8012-02, 12, 20, 22, 30 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statements of Sen.
Hatch of Utah, Sen. Cantwell of Wash., Sen. DeWine of Ohio, Sen. Reid of Nev.
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bill because of its “vital improvements to strengthen the ability of our
justice system to protect children from sex offenders.” 151 One supporter
commented, “Isn’t it common sense to protect young schoolchildren in
the first place by keeping these pedophiles locked up with lengthy prison
sentences? Isn’t it common sense that coddling repeated sex offenders
with self-esteem courses and rehabilitation doesn’t work, and that
locking them up works?” 152 Section 16901 lists the identity and provides
a brief description of multiple victims who were sexually assaulted or
murdered by individuals who had previous sex-offense convictions. 153
Section 16901 also identifies SORNA’s purpose to “protect the
public from sex offenders and offenders against children” by creating a
national and comprehensive system of registry to track all convicted sex
offenders. 154 Congress appears to have believed that a uniform system of
law was the best way of accomplishing this goal. Senators praised
SORNA’s standardization, stating that, “Today there is far too much
disparity among State registration requirements and notification
obligations for sex offenders. . . . Child sex offenders have exploited this

151

152 CONG. REC. E404-01, 1 (daily ed. March 16, 2006) (Speech of Hon. Patrick J.
Kennedy of R.I.).
152
152 CONG. REC. H647-05 (daily ed. March 8, 2006) (statement of Mr. Keller).
153
42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (Westlaw 2011) (“[I]n response to the vicious attacks by violent
predators against the victims listed below, Congress in this chapter establishes a comprehensive
national system for the registration of those offenders: (1) Jacob Wetterling, who was 11 years old,
was abducted in 1989 in Minnesota, and remains missing. (2) Megan Nicole Kanka, who was 7
years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered in 1994, in New Jersey. (3) Pam
Lychner, who was 31 years old, was attacked by a career offender in Houston, Texas. (4) Jetseta
Gage, who was 10 years old, was kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and murdered in 2005, in Cedar
Rapids, Iowa. (5) Dru Sjodin, who was 22 years old, was sexually assaulted and murdered in 2003,
in North Dakota. (6) Jessica Lunsford, who was 9 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted,
buried alive, and murdered in 2005, in Homosassa, Florida. (7) Sarah Lunde, who was 13 years old,
was strangled and murdered in 2005, in Ruskin, Florida. (8) Amie Zyla, who was 8 years old, was
sexually assaulted in 1996 by a juvenile offender in Waukesha, Wisconsin, and has become an
advocate for child victims and protection of children from juvenile sex offenders. (9) Christy Ann
Fornoff, who was 13 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered in 1984, in Tempe,
Arizona. (10) Alexandra Nicole Zapp, who was 30 years old, was brutally attacked and murdered in
a public restroom by a repeat sex offender in 2002, in Bridgewater, Massachusetts. (11) Polly Klaas,
who was 12 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered in 1993 by a career offender
in California. (12) Jimmy Ryce, who was 9 years old, was kidnapped and murdered in Florida on
September 11, 1995. (13) Carlie Brucia, who was 11 years old, was abducted and murdered in
Florida in February, 2004. (14) Amanda Brown, who was 7 years old, was abducted and murdered
in Florida in 1998. (15) Elizabeth Smart, who was 14 years old, was abducted in Salt Lake City,
Utah in June 2002. (16) Molly Bish, who was 16 years old, was abducted in 2000 while working as
a lifeguard in Warren, Massachusetts, where her remains were found 3 years later. (17) Samantha
Runnion, who was 5 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered in California on July
15, 2002.”).
154
42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (Westlaw 2011).
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stunning lack of uniformity, and the consequences have been tragic.” 155
Senator DeWine stressed, “There is no easy way to access information
from different jurisdictions,” 156 and Senator Reid pointed out that
“[SORNA] will . . . give law enforcement agencies the tools they need to
enforce these requirements.” 157
The emotional response that is created by legislation aimed at sex
offenders who victimize children is understandable and justified;
however, it blurs the true issue of whether the legislation in question is
permissible under the Constitution. In nearly one hundred pages of
congressional records reflecting the discussion of SORNA’s
implications, interstate commerce is mentioned only once, and then only
in the context of child pornography, an unquestionably economic
activity. 158 SORNA’s text and legislative history indicate that the
criminal activity Congress sought to regulate has no connection to
interstate commerce, thereby making it an inappropriate use of its
authority under the Commerce Clause.
3.

SORNA Lacks Any Other Ground on Which the Supreme Court May
Uphold It

Absent the jurisdictional hook, Congress has a number of other
means to enact legislation under the Commerce Clause. 159 For example,
although courts consistently declared the CPPA’s jurisdictional hook
insufficient to sustain the legislation, it was eventually upheld as part of a

155

152 CONG. REC. S8012-02, 20 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Cantwell of

Wash.).
156

Id. at 22 (statement of Sen. DeWine of Ohio).
Id. at 30 (statement of Sen. Reid of Nev.).
158
Id. at 27 (statement of Sen. Biden of Del.).
159
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (“As we stated in Wickard, ‘even if
appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.’”
(quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942))); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 55859 (1995) (holding that Congress may regulate (1) “the use of the channels of interstate commerce,”
(2) “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,” and
(3) “activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce”). This Comment does not
purport to examine and exhaust all of the ways Congress could have validly enacted SORNA; this
Comment merely disposes of the Raich analysis under which the CPPA was eventually upheld. See
Raich, 545 U.S. 1. For a thorough discussion of SORNA’s viability under the Commerce Clause
and Necessary and Proper Clause, see Sanford L. Bohrer & Matthew S. Bohrer, Congressional
Power to Criminalize “Local” Conduct: No Limit in Sight, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1221 (2010); Matt
Miller, Comment, A New Breed of Sex Offender Legislation: Why the National Sex Offender
Registry Violates Federalism, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 759 (2009); Robin Morse, Note, Federalism
Challenges to the Adam Walsh Act, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1753 (2009).
157
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broader regulatory scheme. 160 Like respondents’ intrastate possession of
marijuana in Raich, and the intrastate possession of wheat in Wickard, a
child pornographer’s intrastate possession of child pornography
stimulates and maintains the demand for the interstate market in child
pornography. 161 As the Third Circuit described in Rodia, a “common
sense understanding of the demand-side forces . . . helps to demonstrate
the strong nexus between the intrastate possession of and the interstate
market in child pornography. . . . [T]his nexus provides a limiting
principle of the type sought in Lopez . . . .” 162 The Third Circuit’s preRaich decision was unique in its analysis; however, after the Supreme
Court decided Raich in 2005, courts had no choice but to uphold the
CPPA under a similar theory. 163
Unlike the intrastate possession of child pornography criminalized
by the CPPA, the requirement that sex offenders register their
whereabouts affects no interstate market. By no stretch of the
imagination are sex offenders an economic commodity. Again looking
to the Third Circuit’s insightful opinion in Rodia, the nexus present
between the intrastate possession of and interstate market in child
pornography is not “present in criminal regulations that attempt to limit
or ban behavior that does not involve an exchange of goods, such as
murder or assault. This limit is particularly important in the criminal
context, which is an area that traditionally has been regulated by the
states.” 164
SORNA’s “jurisdictional element is directed at overcoming the
legal hurdle of obtaining federal jurisdiction, rather than an aspect of the
primary subject matter Congress wishes to control.” 165 The lack of
nexus between the crime of failing to register and interstate commerce
makes SORNA’s jurisdictional element too attenuated to survive genuine
scrutiny like that from the second era of Commerce Clause and Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence; in fact, SORNA’s jurisdictional hook is too
attenuated to survive even the less stringent review imposed by the
courts reviewing the CPPA.
Because SORNA’s jurisdictional hook does nothing to limit its
effect to activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, and
160

See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 546 U.S. 801
(2005), rev'd, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006).
161
United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Raich, 545 U.S. 1; Wickard,
317 U.S. 111.
162
Rodia, 194 F.3d at 478-79.
163
See, e.g., Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042.
164
Rodia, 194 F.3d at 479.
165
Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042.
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provides no relation between the criminal activity being regulated and
interstate commerce, it cannot fall within congressional authority to
regulate under the Commerce Clause. However, SORNA offends more
than the principle that Congress may regulate only within the scope of
one of its enumerated powers; SORNA also offends the external
limitations on federal authority to regulate. Federal regulation of
criminal conduct, as in SORNA, runs counter to principles of federalism.
For these reasons, courts should hold that SORNA and legislation like it
infringes on the Tenth Amendment.
4.

SORNA’s Jurisdictional Hook Implicates Negative Consequences
for Federalism
The Supreme Court has noted that the federal commerce power
must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our
complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between
what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government. 166

Thus, the Court acknowledged that fundamental principles are put at risk
when the Court fails to prevent Congress from regulating outside the
scope of its permissible authority. 167 As discussed above, Congress did
not create SORNA’s jurisdictional hook with the intention of bringing
the legislation within the permissible scope of authority. This, however,
is a mere procedural deficiency, easily solved by an alteration to
SORNA’s statutory text. SORNA’s infringement on principles of
federalism is more difficult to resolve.
The seminal Commerce Clause cases, United States v. Lopez 168 and
United States v. Morrison, 169 identified the consequences of legislation
passed outside Congress’s authority. The Supreme Court found that both

166

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (quoted in United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)).
167
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (“Under the[se] theories . . ., it is
difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement
or education where States historically have been sovereign.” (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564))
168
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549. In Lopez, the Court struck down the Gun Free School Zones Act
(GFSZA), 18 U.S.C. § 922.
169
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. In Morrison, the Court struck down the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103–322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified in scattered sections
of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
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the GFSZA and the VAWA were examples of “a criminal statute that by
its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.” 170
Having defined the GFSZA and the VAWA as criminal statutes, the
Court assessed the consequences of allowing Congress to legislate in the
field of criminal jurisprudence. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court in Lopez, warned that allowing Congress to regulate violent crime
could create an outcome where
Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the
economic productivity of individual citizens . . . . Under the[se]
theories . . . , it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power,
even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where
States historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the
Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by
an individual that Congress is without power to regulate. 171

Conceding that Congress may, in some cases, regulate intrastate activity,
the Court maintained that “the Constitution . . . withhold[s] from
Congress a plenary police power that would authorize enactment of
every type of legislation.” 172 The Court later identified that it could
“think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders
denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the
suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.” 173 The
Supreme Court struck down both the GFSZA and the VAWA not only
because they lacked sufficient relation to interstate commerce, but also
because their criminal focus threatened the United States’ dual system of
governance. 174
Less than eighteen months after the Court’s decision in Lopez,
Congress amended the GFSZA to apply to possession of a “firearm that
has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce” in
a school zone. 175 The amendment’s only change was the inclusion of a
jurisdictional hook and congressional findings. 176 The Ninth Circuit
upheld this version of the GFSZA, although it is difficult to imagine that
this brief amendment alleviated the substantial concerns espoused by the
170

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564) (emphasis added).
172
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
173
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616-618.
174
See Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
175
18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2011).
176
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2011), as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-208, §
657, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-369-71 (1996).
171

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2011

27

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 5
BIFOSS (FORMATTED).DOC

282

4/23/2011 2:07:55 PM

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

Court only a few years earlier. 177 This jurisdictional hook does not limit
the reach of the statute – nearly all guns will have traveled in interstate
commerce at some point during their manufacture or sale. 178 Most of the
guns involved in GFSZA convictions will probably have achieved their
interstate travel before even coming into the possession of the defendant,
thereby negating any connection between the criminal activity being
regulated, and the gun’s travel in interstate commerce. 179 More
fundamentally, the jurisdictional hook added to the GFSZA does nothing
to address its substantive focus. Congress is still regulating the
possession of guns within 1000 feet of a school – the very activity the
Supreme Court prevented it from regulating eighteen months earlier. 180
SORNA presents a very similar case. SORNA could easily be
amended to apply only to sex offenders who travel in interstate
commerce with the intent of avoiding registration requirements. Equally
effective would be an amendment applying SORNA only to those sex
offenders who fail to update a registration within a reasonable time after
traveling in interstate commerce. 181
Although these changes would bring SORNA into conformity with
jurisdictional hooks deemed constitutional and increase SORNA’s
relation to interstate commerce under existing jurisprudence, these
changes would do nothing to alleviate SORNA’s assault on federalism.
With or without the jurisdictional hook, SORNA seeks to regulate the
registration of individuals convicted of state and federal sex crimes – a
statutory scheme historically within the purview of the states. With these
changes, SORNA would simply resemble the revised GFSZA. 182
Because legislation that infringes on states’ police power should be
declared unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court should adopt
177

See, e.g., United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Contrary to the
prior version of § 922(q) discussed in Lopez, the current version includes a ‘requirement that [the
defendant’s] possession of the firearm have a[ ] concrete tie to interstate commerce.’” (internal
citations omitted)). For a thorough discussion of the revised GFSZA’s constitutional deficiencies,
see Seth J. Safra, Note, The Amended Gun-Free School Zones Act: Doubt as to Its Constitutionality
Remains, 50 DUKE L.J. 637 (2000).
178
Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and
Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675, 1712
(2002).
179
Id.
180
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
181
SORNA currently contains a requirement that sex offenders update their registration “not
later than 3 business days after each change of name, residence, employment, or student status.” 42
U.S.C.A. § 16913(c) (Westlaw 2011). This does not address the issue of the interstate travel being
related to the criminal activity, because the failure to update a registration within three business days
can still occur after an intrastate change in residence.
182
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2011); Dorsey, 418 F.3d at 1046.
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the view of federalism and the strength of the Tenth Amendment last
seen in the second era of constitutional jurisprudence. 183
III. A SUSTAINABLE SOLUTION
In a time when Congress has “seiz[ed] upon [the Court’s]
language” 184 to ensure a presumption of constitutionality, the strong
interpretation given to the Tenth Amendment during the second era of
Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment jurisprudence is necessary to
preserve our “dual system of government.” 185 The Supreme Court
should require that a jurisdictional hook purporting to support legislation
adequately connect that legislation to interstate commerce. However,
even if the legislation satisfies this requirement, the Court should also
scrutinize it to ensure that it does not offend principles of federalism.
With this perspective, the Court should invalidate SORNA and address
the present imbalance between federal and state authority.
The Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart espoused the principles of the
second era of Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.186
In Hammer, the Court looked beyond Congress’s purported connection
to interstate commerce and concluded that Congress’s attempt to regulate
child labor did not “regulate transportation among the states, but aim[ed]
to standardize the ages at which children may be employed in mining and
manufacturing within the states.” 187 Moreover, the Hammer Court used
the Tenth Amendment to curtail Congress’s interference with the states’
“regulation of their civil institutions.” 188 If the Supreme Court used this
analysis to evaluate SORNA’s constitutionality, it would almost certainly
declare it an invalid use of congressional authority.
Looking beyond SORNA’s jurisdictional hook, a second-era
approach would yield the conclusion that “[t]he act in its effect does not
regulate transportation among the states,” 189 but instead aims to “to
protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children.” 190
Like the revised GFSZA, and the legislation at issue in Hammer v.
Dagenhart, SORNA regulates conduct that is outside the purview of

183

See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941).
184
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 46 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
185
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
186
Hammer, 247 U.S. 251.
187
Id. at 271-72.
188
Id. at 274.
189
Id. at 272.
190
42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (Westlaw 2011).
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federal authority, irrespective of its superficial jurisdictional hook.191
Under a second-era approach, the Court would not only strike down
SORNA for falling outside the bounds of congressional authority, but
also for circumventing the Tenth Amendment. Protecting the public
from sex offenders falls squarely within the “safety, health, morals, and
general welfare,” which states have historically had the exclusive
authority to protect. 192 Therefore, under the second era’s structure of a
limited Commerce Clause and a strong Tenth Amendment, SORNA
would be “in a two-fold sense . . . repugnant to the Constitution.” 193
Concededly, striking down SORNA under a second-era Commerce
Clause and Tenth Amendment analysis would prevent Congress from
regulating a dangerous group of offenders. The list of names of children
victimized by repeat offenders provided by SORNA’s statutory text is
sufficient to identify the importance of the issue; 194 that importance is
further supported by the countless children not identified by name in the
legislation. However, the Court in the second era of Commerce Clause
and Tenth Amendment jurisprudence acknowledged such countervailing
policies as well. The Court in Hammer conceded, “there should be
limitations upon the right to employ children in mines and factories in
the interest of their own and the public welfare.” 195 However, those fears
did not control then, and they should not control now. The Supreme
Court in the second era found that concerns over child labor could be
deferred to the expertise of the states. 196 In contrast, concerns over the
balance of authority between the federal and state governments cannot be
similarly deferred. For that reason, in Lopez and Morrison, Chief Justice
Rehnquist found it proper to reject Congress’s attempt to regulate violent
crime. 197 The Chief Justice stated, “In recognizing this fact we preserve
one of the few principles that has been consistent since the Clause was
adopted. The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not
directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate
191

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2011); see also United States v. Dorsey, 418
F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005); Seth J. Safra, Note, The Amended Gun-Free School Zones Act:
Doubt as to Its Constitutionality Remains, 50 DUKE L.J. 637 (2000); Hammer, 247 U.S. 251.
192
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
193
Hammer, 247 U.S. at 276.
194
42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (Westlaw 2011).
195
Hammer, 247 U.S. at 275. These concerns are continually recognized, as was the case
nearly 80 years later in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (“[I]t is doubtful that any
State, or indeed any reasonable person, would argue that it is wise policy to allow students to carry
guns on school premises . . . .”).
196
See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 275.
197
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568).
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commerce has always been the province of the States.” 198
principles apply equally now.

285
These

CONCLUSION
Using tools like the jurisdictional hook, congressional findings, and
the complex regulatory scheme, Congress has circumvented the
traditional limits of its authority and entered the bounds of what should
be governed by state regulation. 199 The Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act is representative of this practice. 200 By no stretch of the
imagination are sex offenders an economic commodity appropriately
regulated by Congress. Nonetheless, courts have upheld SORNA
because of its direct, but superficial, connection to interstate
commerce. 201 The Supreme Court should “decline the invitation to
permit Congress to achieve power beyond its constitutional reach simply
by uttering pretextual incantations evoking the phantasm of
commerce.” 202
However, instead of simply overturning SORNA as being outside
the bounds of congressional authority, the Court should go one step
further. In accepting a challenge to SORNA, the United States Supreme
Court should address Congress’s pattern of creating legislation like
SORNA by reviving the strength of the Tenth Amendment last seen in
the second era of the Court’s applicable jurisprudence. It has been
suggested that the Court would be unwilling to overrule years of theory
and precedent in favor of a new analytical scheme. 203 However, history
198

Id.
See, e.g., Christopher DiPompeo, Federal Hate Crime Laws and United States v. Lopez:
On a Collision Course to Clarify Jurisdictional-Element Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 617, 671
(2008); Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and
Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675
(2002); Robin Morse, Note, Federalism Challenges to the Adam Walsh Act, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1753
(2009); Tara M. Stuckey, Note, Jurisdictional Hooks in the Wake of Raich: On Properly Interpreting
Federal Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2101, 2105 (2006).
200
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250 (Westlaw 2011), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 16901-16962 (Westlaw 2011).
201
United States v. George, 625 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Shenandoah, 595
F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v.
Cain, 583 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Zuniga, 579 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459 (4th Cir.
2009); United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d
709 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 2008).
202
United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042, 1062 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 546 U.S. 801
(2005), rev'd, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006).
203
See Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and
Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675
(2002).
199
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has demonstrated that this is not the case. 204 In fact, each time the Court
has reconsidered Congress’s commerce authority, it has correspondingly
reconsidered the purview of the Tenth Amendment. 205 Still within a few
years of its most recent Commerce Clause decision, the Court should
take this opportunity to be clear in protecting that which “divides
authority between federal and state governments for the protection of
individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: ‘Rather,
federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion
of sovereign power.’” 206
BAILEY BIFOSS 

204

See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 141 (3d ed. 2009) (“There have been
roughly four eras of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”).
205
Id.
206
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).

J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, Cal.;
B.S. Social Work and Political Science, 2008, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, Mich.
This, my first publication, is dedicated to my parents and sister, without whose love, encouragement
and patience I would never have become the person I am today. I wish to thank Professors Keane
and Christiansen for their advice and guidance in the development of this Comment. I also wish to
extend sincere thanks to the staff of the Golden Gate University Law Review and my extraordinary
fellow board members for their feedback and support during the fleeting period this piece was being
developed.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol41/iss2/5

32

